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1 |  INTRODUCTION
There is an emerging consensus that financial market development (FMD) increases foreign direct 
investment (FDI).1 However, studies have typically addressed FMD on just one side of the source–host 
pair, leaving it unclear whether what matters for FDI is only FMD in the host countries, only in the 
source countries or in both host and source countries. We know of just two previous studies consider-
ing the role of financial market conditions in both host and source countries for bilateral FDI, namely 
Coeurdacier, Santis, and Aviat (2009) and Desbordes and Wei (2017, p. 154) who find that "a deep 
financial system in source and destination countries strongly facilitates the international expansion of 
firms through FDI." Importantly, whether FMD in source and host countries functions as comple-
ments or substitutes or promotes FDI independently of each other has to our knowledge not been ana-
lysed at all. The potential conditionality between host country FMD and source country FMD is 
particularly relevant for host countries that have remained on the sidelines in the global competition 
for FDI, such as many developing countries, since typically they score poorly on FMD whereas many, 
though by no means all, of the countries that could potentially invest in them score highly on FMD.
The differences‐in‐differences study by Desbordes and Wei (2017) is based on firm‐level data on 
greenfield FDI projects in the manufacturing sector that are not freely available.2 Our analysis comple-
1 See, for example, Klein et al. (2002), Di Giovanni (2005), Antràs et al. (2009), Alfaro et al. (2009), Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos (2010), Kaur et al. (2013), Bilir et al. (2019), Buch et al. (2014) and Otchere et al. (2016).
2 These data are collected by fDi Markets (http://www.fdima rkets.com/), a fee‐based service from the Financial Times.
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ments and extends the work of Desbordes and Wei (2017) in several ways. First and most importantly, we 
explore whether the effects of source‐ and host country FMD are conditional on each other. Second, we 
use a broader measure of FMD based on a comprehensive set of financial indicators, employing the unob-
served component model suggested by Donaubauer, Meyer, and Nunnenkamp (2016a, 2016b). We regard 
this broadly defined and time‐varying index as a major improvement over the existing literature, which 
typically approximates financial market conditions by just bank credit and stock market capitalisation 
only, whereas FMD goes well beyond these two, albeit admittedly important, aspects of developed finan-
cial markets. Third, our panel data set covers the period 2001–12 and thus a significantly longer time pe-
riod than the analysis of Desbordes and Wei (2017) which is restricted to just 4 years (2003–06). Finally, 
we rely on bilateral FDI stocks as officially released by UNCTAD. As discussed in more detail in Section 
3, we consider this FDI measure to be most appropriate in the context of assessing the role of financial 
market conditions in the global competition for external resources accessible through inward FDI.
We find positive, statistically significant and substantively important independent effects of both 
source and host country FMD on FDI. When we test for conditionality between the two FMD mea-
sures, we find no evidence for it in the global sample. However, if we restrict the host countries to 
developing countries, we find that source country FMD can function as a substitute for host country 
FMD, and vice versa. This central finding is robust to a battery of tests, in which we employ plausible 
modifications to the definition of the sample and the specification of the estimation model.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the analytical background and derives our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methods and the data used. We present our empirical results in 
Section 4 and conclude in Section 5 with what our results imply for developing host countries.
2 |  ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
As shown by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004, p. 300), "of those firms that serve foreign markets, 
only the most productive engage in FDI." Compared to serving foreign countries through exports and 
other arm's length interactions, FDI involves particularly high fixed costs upfront since an affiliate 
has to be established or acquired in the host country. Highly productive firms may cover these fixed 
costs at least partly through internal financing. However, the availability of external financing clearly 
renders it easier to cover the fixed costs of undertaking FDI. As access to external financing depends 
on FMD, it is to be expected that better developed financial markets in the source country result in 
higher outward FDI (Desbordes & Wei, 2017).
In a similar vein, Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) advanced the so‐called "relative access to credit 
hypothesis" according to which outward FDI depends on the ability of potential investors to raise exter-
nal funds. These authors highlight the role of imperfect capital markets in source countries of FDI that 
may impair the availability of credit and is, thus, expected to be associated with less outward FDI, nota-
bly by bank‐dependent foreign investors. Indeed, Klein et al. (2002, p. 665) find that firms "associated 
with less healthy banks" are less likely to engage in FDI. Specifically, they show that the links between 
Japanese MNCs and troubled banks at home help explain the decline of Japanese FDI in the United 
States in the 1990s. In a similar vein, Buch, Kesternich, Lipponer, and Schnitzer (2014) show that finan-
cially constrained German firms are less likely to undertake FDI. Analysing the determinants of M&A 
deals during the 1990s, Di Giovanni (2005) finds that stock market capitalisation in the home country of 
the acquiring firms is strongly and positively associated with their M&A activity abroad.
This leads to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Better financial market development in the source country encourages outward FDI.
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As stressed by Feldstein (2000, p. 2), "not all foreign direct investment around the world represents 
net capital flows. Often such investments are financed in local markets." Likewise, Alfaro, Kalemni‐
Ozcan, and Sayek (2009, pp. 113–114) argue that foreign investors "tend to finance an important share 
of their investment in the local market." Foreign investors may rely on local financial markets for various 
reasons, including as a hedging device against exchange rate fluctuations (Harrison, Love, & McMillan, 
2004). As noted by Harrison et al. (2004), enterprise surveys suggest that local financing constraints 
tend to deter (foreign as well as domestic) investment, particularly in developing countries.3
Well‐functioning financial markets in the host countries help reduce the costs of external finance 
for firms (e.g., Rajan & Zingales, 1998), including foreign firms seeking access to local (co‐) financ-
ing. According to Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004, p. 2453), "interest rates on external debt differ for 
affiliates of the same American parent company located in different host countries in a manner that 
corresponds to measures of capital market depth and creditor rights."4 Moreover, local financial inter-
mediaries may help foreign investors to overcome informational asymmetries by sharing local knowl-
edge on risks and market opportunities (Kinda, 2010).
Better developed financial markets in the host country could attract FDI also in indirect ways. By 
relaxing the credit constraints of local firms, FMD allows for greater variety of intermediate inputs in 
the host country (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemni‐Ozcan, & Sayek, 2010). Easier availability of intermedi-
ates, in turn, encourages higher FDI to the extent that foreign firms depend on such local inputs. More 
generally, better developed financial markets may promote FDI by facilitating interactions between 
foreign and local firms (Kinda, 2010). Another indirect effect is that FMD may help expand local 
market size (Desbordes & Wei, 2017), thus promoting market‐seeking (horizontal) FDI.
This leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Better financial market development in the host countries attracts FDI to these 
countries.
However, Desbordes and Wei (2017) argue that the effect of FMD in the host country on inward 
FDI is theoretically ambiguous. Credit constraints due to deficient financial markets are likely to 
affect domestic firms in the first place, while it is easier for foreign firms to raise external finance 
abroad. This would imply that domestic firms are the main beneficiaries of FMD in the host country. 
By promoting local firm development, this competition effect may render the host country less attrac-
tive to foreign investors (see also Bilir, Chor, & Manova, 2019).
Related to this reasoning, the effects of FMD in the host country on bilateral FDI are likely to de-
pend on FMD in the source country. Specifically, less developed financial markets in the host country 
could have less adverse effects on FDI from financially more developed source countries, compared 
to FDI from financially less developed source countries. Indeed, Desai et al. (2004, p. 2453) find that 
affiliates of US‐based parent companies increase internal borrowing from parent companies to offset 
most of the reduction in external borrowing due to poor financial market conditions in the host coun-
tries. In other words, poor FMD in the host countries is associated with more FDI in the form of 
intra‐company loans.5 However, adverse effects on (overall) bilateral FDI become more likely when 
3 See, for example, the survey of executives in African countries in the African Competitiveness Report (World Economic 
Forum, 1998).
4 As discussed below, however, this may induce substitution effects so that FDI by US‐based companies is not necessarily 
lower in financially less developed host countries.
5 Note that this does not necessarily imply that overall FDI increases since other forms of FDI, that is, equity capital in new 
projects, are likely to be negatively affected.
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parent companies are based in source countries that are financially less developed than the United 
States, that is, where it is more difficult to offset financing constraints in the host countries.
This rationale for a substitutive conditional effect of FMD in the host and source country on FDI is 
supplemented by a similar rationale that looks at intra‐company loans as hidden or indirect foreign 
borrowing. The above reasoning is corroborated by Baier, Bergstrand, Gainer, and Xu (2018) who 
point out that more highly developed financial markets in the source country may induce foreign af-
filiates in the host country to borrow financial resources from the parent company located in the 
source country in the form of intra‐company loans, rather than raising these financial resources in the 
less developed financial markets of the host country itself. Peng and Wang (2016, p. 15, as cited by 
Baier et al., 2018) argue for the case of more highly developed financial markets in the host country: 
"Raising funds through their foreign affiliates by the Chinese enterprises has become one of the major 
ways of foreign borrowing, which has been dubbed as 'in direct foreign borrowing'."6 These loans will 
be accounted for as negative FDI flows in the (Chinese) statistics and better developed FMD in the 
host country can thus indirectly undermine the positive effect of FMD in the less developed source 
country of FDI.
Conversely, the positive effects of FMD in the host country on bilateral FDI may diminish the more 
advanced financial markets that are in the source country. This is also because less costly financial 
contracting, stronger creditor rights and verifiable monitoring of arm's length transactions reduce the 
incentives to undertake FDI and strengthen the incentives to instead rely on market relations when 
engaging in the host country (Antràs, Desai, & Foley, 2009).7 Using data on the financial characteris-
tics of US firms operating abroad, Antràs et al. (2009) report empirical evidence supporting their 
prediction that fewer financial frictions in the host countries weaken the reliance on FDI financing of 
overseas operations.
It is questionable, however, whether this finding carries over to source countries that are less ad-
vanced than the United States, for instance, in terms of financial monitoring and alternative ways of 
financing operations abroad. Furthermore, foreign investors based in less advanced source countries 
are widely perceived to be less risk averse and more familiar with deficient financial market condi-
tions.8 Accordingly, FMD in the host countries would be less likely to induce substitution effects be-
tween FDI and other forms of overseas engagement by investors based in less advanced source 
countries.
Consequently, we expect that FMD in source and host countries can function as substitutes for each 
other and formulate as our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 The effect of financial market development in host countries is conditional on 
financial market development in source countries. Specifically, the positive effect of better de-
veloped financial markets in the host country diminishes with better financial market develop-
ment in the source country.
6 The original Peng and Wang (2016) article is in Chinese, which is why we cite indirectly from Baier et al. (2018).
7 In other words, the model of Antràs et al. (2009) predicts a lower share of FDI financing of MNC activity in host countries 
with better developed financial markets, while the scale on MNC activity (e.g., in terms of production and sales) is expected to 
increase in such host countries. In a similar vein, Hausmann and Fernández‐Arias (2001, p. 21) argue that "countries that are 
riskier, less financially developed and have weaker institutions tend to attract less capital but more of it in the form of FDI."
8 For instance, Lall (1983, p. 6) argued that MNCs based in emerging economies have advantages vis‐à‐vis competitors from 
more developed countries because of "the ability to function better in the environment of other LDCs." However, Sosa 
Andrés, Nunnenkamp, & Busse, (2013) contradict the view that nontraditional investors are generally less risk averse than 
their peers based in advanced source countries.
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3 |  METHODS AND DATA
We estimate gravity‐type models for bilateral FDI stocks of source country s in host country h in pe-
riod t. The baseline specification is as follows:
An extended specification accounts for possible complementarities or substitutability of FMD in 
the source and host country of FDI:
The dependent FDI variable consists of bilateral stocks at the end of the period, publicly available 
from UNCTAD since 2001.9 In contrast to the FDI data used by Di Giovanni (2005) as well as 
Desbordes and Wei (2017), this data set includes both greenfield FDI and M&As. Moreover, UNCTAD 
data cover FDI in manufacturing industries as well as service sectors, and they are not restricted to 
initial capital expenditures when FDI projects are launched, but also include sequential FDI, for in-
stance, through reinvested earnings.10 We use bilateral FDI stocks which are typically less volatile 
than bilateral FDI flows on an annual basis (see, e.g., de Sousa & Lochard, 2011).
Our sample includes 43 (traditional and nontraditional) source countries reporting bilateral FDI 
stocks in sufficient detail for 137 host countries during the period 2001–12, covering almost 90% of 
worldwide FDI stocks in 2012 as reported by UNCTAD. We exclude financial offshore centres such 
as the Bahamas or Cyprus.11 In a robustness test, we additionally exclude all countries considered to 
be tax havens by one of the three sources listed in Appendix 2 of Hines and Rice (1994). We set to zero 
observations, for which UNCTAD reports no actual number but indicates a value of zero or a "negli-
gible value" for the bilateral FDI stock, but in a robustness test, we set all these observations to missing 
instead. Similarly, we set to zero the small share of observations of circa 1.2% (full sample) and 1.4% 
(developing country host sample) with negative FDI stock entries. As explained by Baier et al. (2018), 
FDI stocks can be negative since foreign affiliates can be net lenders to the parent company in the 
source country. In a robustness test, we show that our results are fully robust towards dropping all 
observations with negative FDI stocks.
We are primarily interested in assessing the impact of financial market development (FMD), 
broadly conceived, in the source and host country on FDI as well as potential conditionality be-
tween the two effects. Instead of relying on just one or two specific indicators of FMD as most of 
the previous literature, we follow Donaubauer et al. (2016b) in making use of systematic and 
(1)
FDIsht= exp [훼1 lnGDPst−1+훼2 lnGDPht−1+훼3 lnGDPpcst−1+훼4 lnGDPpcht−1+훼5FMDst−1
+훼6FMDht−1+휂sh+휃t]+휀sht.
(2)
FDIsht= exp [훼1 lnGDPst−1+훼2 lnGDPht−1+훼3 lnGDPpcst−1+훼4 lnGDPpcht−1+훼5FMDst−1
+훼6FMDht−1+훼7
(
FMDst−1×FMDht−1
)
+휂sh+휃t]+휀sht.
9 Available at: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/ DIAE/FDI%20Sta tisti cs/FDI-Stati stics-Bilat eral.aspx.
10 As stressed by Desbordes and Wei (2017, p. 158), the firm‐level data they use "only reflect initial fixed costs incurred by 
firms" engaging in FDI projects in manufacturing. Note also that these data do not distinguish between internal and external 
financing of FDI projects. In other words, the data used by Desbordes and Wei include external funding through borrowing 
from unrelated sources in the home and/or host country, or in third countries. Funding from these sources is not part of FDI 
according to internationally agreed guidelines.
11 The list of OFCs is taken from the International Monetary Fund (for details, see Zoromé, 2007). See Appendix Tables A2 
and A3 for the list of source and host countries.
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comprehensive measures of FMD. We employ a composite index of FMD based on nine indicators, 
capturing the stability, depth and efficiency of financial systems as well as the access to finance: 
the banks' Z‐score and stock price volatility (stability); private credit by deposit money banks rela-
tive to GDP, the value of total shares traded on the stock market exchange relative to GDP, and 
money and quasi‐money (M2) as percentage of GDP (depth); the stock market turnover ratio (effi-
ciency); and the number of bank accounts per capita, the value of all traded shares outside the 
largest 10 traded companies as a share of the total value of all traded shares and the number of 
publicly listed companies per capita (access).12 An unobserved component model is used to com-
bine the information from the different indicators; accordingly, observed data on each aspect of 
FMD are a linear function of an unobserved common component of FMD and an error term.13 This 
approach, which resembles the construction of the well‐known Worldwide Governance Indicators 
by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011), allows for a consistent picture of FMD on an annual 
basis for all countries in our sample.14
Using this comprehensive measure of FMD has three major advantages: first, as noted above, our 
FMD measure covers a very broad range of financial market indicators, including those that are most 
commonly used in the literature. Second, as pointed out by Kaufmann et al. (2011), a constructed mea-
sure based on an unobserved component model can be presumed to be more informative and precise 
about the quantity and quality of FMD than single indicators. Third, our FMD measure is available for 
a larger country sample than any single indicator.
Figure A1  in the Appendix ranks all sample countries at the end of our period of observation 
(2012) for which data on FMD are available.15 Figure A2 additionally shows the distribution of FMD 
across a global map for both 2001 and 2012.
Apart from our focus on FMD, our estimation models are specified parsimoniously. Our models 
include the FDI partner countries' GDP (lnGDP) and GDP per capita (lnGDPpc), both in logged 
form.16 In addition, we include country‐pair (dyad) fixed effects as well as time fixed effects. The 
source–host pair fixed effects, ηsh, control for all time‐invariant characteristics of each country pair 
(e.g., the geographical distance between FDI partner countries). Time fixed effects, θt, control for 
12 Donaubauer et al. (2016b) consider these financial market indicators as part of their overall index of infrastructure. We 
updated their (sub‐) index on financial market development for the present study. The data on the indicators are available 
from the World Bank's Global Financial Development Database (available at: http://data.world bank.org/data-catal og/
global-finan cial-devel opment), from Beck and Demirgüç‐Kunt (2009) and from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators (WDI, available at: http://data.world bank.org/data-catal og/world-devel opment-indic ators ).
13 It is important to note that for estimating an unobserved component model (UCM), it is not necessary to observe all nine 
indicators that feed into our FMD measure for each point in time. As discussed in more detail in Donaubauer et al. (2016b) 
and Kaufmann et al. (2011), we need three single representative indicators for any country in a given year as a minimum 
requirement in order to identify the common unobserved component of FMD. While having more indicators is not essential 
for the identification of the UCM parameters, more than three indicators are clearly desirable to obtain a broader picture of 
FMD. The problem of varying sample size from year to year due to varying data availability for different indicators (and 
hence a potential selection bias) is solved by rescaling our FMD measure. This ensures comparability across years and 
countries. In particular, by rescaling we avoid that our FMD measure in earlier periods is distorted by the under‐representa-
tion of low‐performing countries in earlier periods.
14 See Appendix Table A1 for summary statistics.
15 Not surprisingly, most top performers with regard to FMD belong to the high‐income group of countries. Outside this 
group, China and Jordan represent the first upper‐middle‐income countries on rank 5 and 6, respectively, and India the first 
lower‐middle‐income country on rank 21. The bottom of the ranking is dominated by low‐income and lower‐middle‐income 
countries, with Kazakhstan, Uganda and Argentina performing worst.
16 The data on GDP and GDPpc are taken from the WDI.
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common shocks during our period of observation that affect all pairs in essentially the same way (such 
as the financial crisis in 2008). Standard errors are clustered on country pairs (dyads).
We follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and estimate our model with fixed effects (pseudo‐) 
Poisson maximum likelihood. Since the determinants of whether there is any bilateral FDI could 
differ from the determinants of the level of FDI, we additionally estimate in a robustness test separate 
first‐stage fixed‐effects logit models where the dependent variable is whether the host receives any 
FDI from the source in a particular year, and second‐stage fixed‐effects models on the log of FDI, con-
ditional on positive FDI stocks in the source–host country pair. All explanatory variables are lagged 
by one period.
One‐period lags are hardly sufficient to account for possible endogeneity concerns, however. 
While we address unobserved time‐invariant heterogeneity by including country‐pair fixed effects, 
neither bias from time‐varying omitted variables nor reverse causality can be excluded. As concerns 
reverse causality, previous research has shown that FDI could help advance the host countries' 
FMD. Harrison et al. (2004) find that FDI inflows are associated with relaxed credit constraints at 
the firm level; this holds in particular for domestically owned firms in low‐income host countries.17 
Likewise, Otchere, Soumaré, and Yourougou (2016) argue that FDI contributes to improving the 
depth and transparency of financial markets in Africa, where stock markets tend to be less liquid and 
less transparent than in more advanced economies.18 We have no plausible instrument that would 
fulfil the exclusion restriction; hence, we cannot solve the endogeneity problem with instrumental 
variable regression. In its stead, we indirectly account for possible reverse causality by restricting 
the sample to observations where this endogeneity concern should be less relevant. Specifically, we 
exclude host countries falling into the top quartile of countries whose banking system is foreign‐
dominated and, in separate estimations, we exclude host countries' top‐3 source country investors 
(see Section 4 for details).
As for potential omitted variable bias, in the robustness section we include a number of further 
control variables that are, however, not available for the total sample so that we lose some observa-
tions. Nevertheless, these robustness tests help us establish whether specific variables omitted from 
the main analysis are likely to bias the results on our central explanatory variables, namely FMD in 
both countries plus their interaction effect.
In addition to full sample results, we also report and indeed focus on a sub‐sample with only devel-
oping host countries included, which excludes all countries that became members of the Organisation 
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) before 2010 and that are at the same time clas-
sified as high‐income countries by the World Bank—see Table A3. We subject the definition of what 
counts as a developing country to robustness tests since, at the margin, any such definition is some-
what arbitrary. As noted in the Introduction, the question of whether better developed local financial 
markets help attract FDI is particularly relevant for host countries that have remained on the sidelines 
in the global competition for FDI, as many developing countries have. At the same time, financial 
market conditions are often deficient in developing countries with greater potential to reform them 
and, thereby, potentially attract higher FDI. Focusing on developing host countries also allows us 
to address the concern about inappropriate pooling of developed and developing host countries that 
Blonigen and Wang (2004) draw attention to.
17 As stressed by Harrison et al. (2004), this result is in contrast to Harrison and McMillan (2003) who find that financing 
constraints of firms in Ivory Coast were exacerbated by the presence of foreign firms.
18 The empirical analysis of Otchere et al. (2016) points to bidirectional causality between FDI and the development of local 
financial markets. Soumaré and Tchana Tchana (2015) find that the effects of FDI inflows depend on whether indicators of 
stock markets or the banking sector are used as proxies of financial market development.
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4 |  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we report the results from our baseline estimations, extended estimations and robust-
ness tests.
4.1 | Baseline estimations
Table 1 reports our baseline estimation results. Note that all dyads which have no FDI stocks over the 
entire sample period are dropped from the estimations since these observations are collinear with the 
dyad fixed effects. Column (1) of Table 1 shows results for the effects on FDI of FMD in the source 
and the host country, while we additionally enter the interaction between FMD in both countries of a 
pair in separate estimations reported in column (2).19 We then repeat both sets of estimations for a 
sub‐sample of developing host countries only.
For the full sample, we find that bilateral FDI increases with better developed financial markets 
in the host and the source country and FMD in both countries of a pair plays a similarly important 
role in substantive terms. Coefficients in Poisson models can be interpreted as semi‐elasticities. A 
one standard deviation improvement in FMD in host countries is predicted to increase bilateral FDI 
stocks by about 8.7%. There is less variation in FMD among source countries. A one standard devi-
ation improvement in this variable is therefore predicted to increase bilateral FDI stocks by less than 
19 For ease of interpretation, we mean‐centre the two FMD variables in the interaction effect estimation.
T A B L E  1  Baseline estimation results (full sample and developing host countries' sample)
 
Full sample Developing host countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnGDPst−1 2.149*** 2.141*** 0.781 0.773
(0.618) (0.623) (0.487) (0.472)
lnGDPpcst−1 −0.675 −0.674 0.792* 0.752*
(0.554) (0.556) (0.423) (0.402)
lnGDPht−1 0.985*** 0.988*** 1.062*** 1.019***
(0.372) (0.370) (0.321) (0.317)
lnGDPpcht−1 0.257 0.259 −0.0274 −0.0131
(0.394) (0.395) (0.292) (0.292)
FMDst−1 0.0930** 0.111* 0.223*** 0.274***
(0.0363) (0.0573) (0.0493) (0.0505)
FMDht−1 0.0835** 0.0931** 0.178*** 0.228***
(0.0414) (0.0387) (0.0448) (0.0461)
FMDst−1 × FMDht−1   −0.0178   −0.166***
  (0.0385)   (0.0436)
No. of observations 23,780 23,780 15,350 15,350
No. of country pairs 2,478 2,478 1,635 1,635
Notes: Dyad fixed effects and year fixed effects included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered on dyads. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
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that despite the almost identical coefficient estimate, namely by about 7.7%. The results are hardly 
affected when adding the interaction between FMD in the source and host country in column (2), 
and we find no statistically significant evidence that FMD in source and host countries conditions 
each other.
Importantly, this result fundamentally changes when the sample is restricted to developing host 
countries. First, the estimated effects of FMD become much stronger20—17.6% for FMD in source 
countries and 15.9% for FMD in host countries in column (3). Second, we now find a substitutive 
conditioning effect between the two FMD measures in the model reported in column (4). The coeffi-
cient of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, which is suggestive of a condition-
ing effect. However, since with non‐linear estimators like Poisson, the existence of conditional effects 
cannot be reliably inferred by assessing the statistical significance of the interaction term coefficient 
(Ai & Norton, 2003); we further evaluate the existence of an interaction effect by plotting predicted 
average marginal effects.21 Figure 1 plots the effect of a one‐unit change in FMD in the host country, 
which is approximately equal to its standard deviation, over the range of FMD in the source country. 
At very low levels of FMD in source countries, the effect of improving FMD in host countries is very 
large at about 85% but with a wide 95% confidence interval around it. Figure A3 in the Appendix 
which plots the density histogram of FMD in source countries shows, however, that the vast majority 
of observations are in a range where the effect is well below 50%. At very high levels of FMD in 
source countries, the effect becomes substantively zero and statistically insignificant. This condition-
ing effect is our most novel and interesting result, and it is therefore the findings for the developing 
host countries' sub‐sample that we subject to further analysis and robustness tests further below.
With regard to our control variables, the effects of market size, as reflected in the source and host 
country's GDP, are statistically significantly positive, except for GDP of the origin country in columns 
20 Combining the estimations from the two samples in seemingly unrelated estimation allows us to test whether the estimated 
coefficients differ statistically significantly. We find that the effects of FMD in developing host countries are stronger in the 
estimations shown in the developing host country sample compared to the full sample.
21 We have done so for all estimation models in which an interaction term is included, but for reasons of space, we only show 
the relevant figure plotting marginal effects here.
F I G U R E  1  The conditional effect of financial market development in developing host countries' sample 
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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(3) and (4) where it is marginally statistically insignificant. In contrast to market size, the effects 
of average per‐capita incomes are mostly statistically insignificant, with the exception of per‐capita 
income of the origin country which has a positive effect on FDI into developing host countries. The 
statistically insignificant effects of the host country's GDP per capita may be due to opposing effects 
on different types of FDI: while horizontal FDI could be attracted by higher purchasing power, re-
flected in higher per‐capita income, vertical FDI could be discouraged by the accompanying increase 
in labour costs.
4.2 | Imposing further restrictions on the developing host country sample
In this sub‐section, as an indirect way of dealing with reverse causality, we impose two sets of sample 
restrictions to the sub‐sample of developing host countries. First, we exclude pairs with host countries 
where the banking system is dominated by foreign banks. Specifically, we exclude the quartile of host 
countries reporting the highest percentage of foreign banks among total banks in the country during 
the period 1995–2012. The data are taken from Claessens and van Horen (2014, 2015). Excluding 
this quartile of host countries provides an indirect way to address concerns about reverse causality. 
Arguably, reverse causality is most likely if FDI figures prominently in the host country's banking 
system and drives FMD in the host country. In the absence of sectoral FDI data, we take the share of 
the banking system dominated by foreign banks as a proxy variable. Results reported in columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 2 show that the baseline results from Table 1 are hardly affected. The same holds true 
if we exclude source–host pairs where the source country belongs to the top‐3 sources of FDI in the 
host country, as results reported in columns (3) and (4) show. One would expect that any causal effects 
of FDI on the host country's FMD should be less likely once the major sources of FDI are excluded. 
Some of the arguments for reverse causality point towards host country governments improving the 
financial market conditions in the interest of major FDI source countries. Excluding the top investors 
should reduce reverse causality because minor source countries have less bargaining power vis‐à‐vis 
the host country's government.
4.3 | Robustness tests
Tables 3‒7 report a number of robustness tests. The estimations reported on in Table 3 relax the as-
sumption that there is only one stage of FDI decisions and instead allow the determinants for whether 
there is any FDI to differ from the determinants of the size of the FDI stock, conditional on the exist-
ence of FDI. This allows us to test whether the substitutive conditional relationship exists only at the 
extensive, only at the intensive, or at both FDI margins. The fixed‐effects first‐stage logit estimations 
for which results are reported in columns (1) and (2) estimate the effects of FMD on the likelihood 
that a source country starts to have FDI stocks in a developing host country during the sample period 
or ceases to have any FDI stock during the sample period if it had such stocks before. Note that all 
dyads which have either no FDI stocks over the entire sample period or have FDI stocks over the 
entire sample period are dropped from the estimations since these observations are collinear with the 
dyad fixed effects in logit estimations. In columns (3) and (4), we report results on the effects of FMD 
on the level of FDI stocks a source country holds in those host countries in which it holds any stock 
(second‐stage estimations). While the coefficients are no longer comparable to the one‐stage estima-
tions, of course, the substitutive conditional relationship between source and host country FMD holds 
in both stages of the two‐stage estimation set‐up.
In models for which results are reported in Table 4, we return to the pseudo‐Poisson one‐stage 
estimation model and test the robustness of our results to plausible changes in the definition of 
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what counts as a developing host country. In columns (1) and (2), we adopt a narrower definition of 
developing country by excluding all countries that are both members of the OECD, independently 
of their date of joining the organisation, and that are considered high‐income countries by the 
World Bank's country classification. This excludes Chile, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia. In columns (3) and (4), we do the opposite and adopt a broader definition of developing 
country by including instead the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovakia and South Korea 
in the developing host country sample. Table 4 shows that our results on FMD in both host and 
source countries and its substitutive conditioning effect are hardly affected by these changes to the 
sample definition.
In robustness tests reported in Table 5, we restrict the sample in several ways. In columns (1) and 
(2), we exclude all (source and host) countries identified by one of three sources as tax haven coun-
tries, as listed in Appendix 2 of Hines and Rice (1994). In columns (3) and (4), we exclude Argentina, 
Kazakhstan and Venezuela as source countries, which allows us to test whether the substitutive con-
ditioning effect is driven by these three source countries, which might be regarded as unusual since 
these three countries are the only source countries with very low FMD, as shown in Figure A1. Again, 
neither change in sample definition affects our results much. In columns (5) and (6), we exclude 
source–host pairs where the source country belongs to the top‐15 countries in terms of FMD. We 
argued in Section 3 that firms in countries with highly developed financial markets are less financially 
constrained and therefore do not need to invest specifically in host countries with very good FMD. 
Consequently, FMD in host countries should be less important for firms from source countries with 
T A B L E  2  Excluding developing host countries dominated by foreign banks and excluding top‐3 investors 
(developing host countries' sample)
 
Excl. top‐25% foreign‐dominated 
banking Excl. top‐3 investors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnGDPst−1 0.974* 0.980* 1.926** 1.869**
(0.526) (0.507) (0.763) (0.756)
lnGDPpcst−1 0.674 0.622 −0.523 −0.485
(0.426) (0.396) (0.607) (0.586)
lnGDPht−1 1.443*** 1.408*** 1.303*** 1.262***
(0.386) (0.380) (0.395) (0.391)
lnGDPpcht−1 −0.420 −0.427 −0.332 −0.298
(0.320) (0.316) (0.304) (0.300)
FMDst−1 0.192*** 0.240*** 0.215*** 0.273***
(0.0533) (0.0554) (0.0746) (0.0775)
FMDht−1 0.235*** 0.311*** 0.158** 0.190***
(0.0543) (0.0542) (0.0620) (0.0596)
FMDst−1 × FMDht−1   −0.222***   −0.143***
  (0.0461)   (0.0516)
No. of observations 10,804 10,804 12,224 12,224
No. of country pairs 1,226 1,226 1,311 1,311
Notes: Dyad fixed effects and year fixed effects included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered on dyads. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
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very good FMD. Excluding the top‐15 source countries in terms of FDM, one would therefore expect 
the effect of FMD in host countries to become much more important than in the baseline model. This 
is exactly what we find: the coefficient of FMD in the host country almost doubles and is statistically 
significantly different from the baseline specification. The conditioning effect between the two FMD 
measures should become less important (or even disappear) once we exclude source countries with 
well‐developed financial markets. Indeed, the coefficient on the interaction term is now insignificant 
in column (6) and considerably smaller compared to our baseline estimates.
In Table 6, we test whether our results depend on the recoding to zero of values of FDI stocks 
indicated by UNCTAD to be zero or of "negligible value" and the recoding of negative FDI stocks to 
zero. Columns (1) and (2) are based on dropping all observations with negative FDI stock values in the 
original data, and columns (3) and (4) additionally drop all observations listed by UNCTAD as having 
zero or negligible value. Our results remain fully robust.
In models for which results are reported in Table 7, we include a range of further control vari-
ables: a dummy variable set to one for country pairs that are members of a regional trade agreement 
(RTA) and zero otherwise; dummy variables set to one for pairs of countries that have signed a bilat-
eral investment treaty (BIT) or a double taxation treaty (DTT) and zero otherwise; measures of insti-
tutional quality (ROL); and natural resource endowments (Resources) in the FDI host country.22 In 
22 Data on RTAs are taken from Mario Larch's RTA Database (http://www.ewf.uni-bayre uth.de/en/resea rch/RTA-data/index.
html). Data on BITs and DTTs are from UNCTAD (http://inves tment polic yhub.unctad.org/IIA). As a measure for institu-
tional quality, we include the index of rule of law from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Data on resources (total 
natural resources rents as percentage of GDP) and education (primary school enrolment ratio) are taken from the WDI.
T A B L E  3  Robustness tests (developing host countries' sample)
 
First stage (logit) Second stage (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnGDPst−1 0.673 0.659 3.033*** 3.012***
(0.628) (0.629) (0.557) (0.562)
lnGDPpcst−1 1.019** 0.989** −0.835 −0.831
(0.474) (0.476) (0.516) (0.522)
lnGDPht−1 1.910*** 1.918*** 1.166*** 1.162***
(0.537) (0.538) (0.345) (0.345)
lnGDPpcht−1 0.775 0.792* −0.0663 −0.0681
(0.473) (0.474) (0.346) (0.346)
FMDst−1 0.286** 0.279** 0.0788 0.0778
(0.134) (0.134) (0.0524) (0.0524)
FMDht−1 0.397*** 0.408*** 0.179*** 0.177***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.0476) (0.0469)
FMDst−1 × FMDht−1   −0.231**   −0.101**
  (0.0975)   (0.0443)
No. of observations 7,446 7,446 11,572 11,572
No. of country pairs 799 799 1,649 1,649
Notes: Dyad fixed effects and year fixed effects included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered on dyads. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
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addition, we include two measures of differences in factor endowments between source and host 
country, namely the difference in terms of human capital (proxied by the difference in a human cap-
ital index, HC difference) and in terms of physical capital stock per employee (PC difference), with 
data sourced from the Penn World Table version 9.0. Note that RTA, BIT and DTT only capture 
country pairs that enter (or, rarely, exit) such treaties during our sample period since all dyad vari-
ables that do not vary over time such as common language or colonial ties are absorbed by the dyad 
fixed effects. The inclusion of these variables allows us to test whether our main results spuriously 
pick up the effect of correlated control variables. As a final control variable, we include imports of 
the host country from the source country. We realise that including imports as a control variable is 
only a first step towards addressing the complex interactions between FDI, FMD and trade. Trade 
and FDI are not independent from each other with both substitution and complementary effects pos-
sible (Blonigen, 2001), and some evidence suggests that FMD has a positive effect on trade as well 
(Manova, Wei, & Zhang, 2015). Note that we lose about 20% of observations due to lack of data. The 
unconditional effects of FMD in the source and host countries are slightly weaker in substantive 
terms. Other than that, the baseline results are fully robust to this test.
In the estimations reported in columns (3) and (4), we deal with unobserved time‐invariant hetero-
geneity in a different way by replacing the dyad fixed effects used hitherto with host and source coun-
try fixed effects. We now have to control for dyadic heterogeneity in different ways, which we do by 
additionally including the log of distance and dummy variables for common language, a shared 
T A B L E  4  Robustness tests (developing host countries' sample)
 
Narrower definition of developing 
country
Broader definition of develop-
ing country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnGDPst−1 0.759 0.766 0.781 0.773
(0.490) (0.476) (0.487) (0.472)
lnGDPpcst−1 0.766* 0.729* 0.792* 0.752*
(0.421) (0.401) (0.423) (0.402)
lnGDPht−1 1.089*** 1.053*** 1.062*** 1.019***
(0.332) (0.329) (0.321) (0.317)
lnGDPpcht−1 −0.0579 −0.0471 −0.0274 −0.0131
(0.294) (0.294) (0.292) (0.292)
FMDst−1 0.239*** 0.288*** 0.223*** 0.274***
(0.0529) (0.0539) (0.0493) (0.0505)
FMDht−1 0.193*** 0.239*** 0.178*** 0.228***
(0.0465) (0.0479) (0.0448) (0.0461)
FMDst−1 × FMDht−1   −0.160***   −0.166***
  (0.0461)   (0.0436)
No. of observations 14,042 14,042 15,350 15,350
No. of country pairs 1,496 1,496 1,635 1,635
Notes: Dyad fixed effects and year fixed effects included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered on dyads. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
   | 547DONAUBAUER Et Al.
colonial history and geographical contiguity into the estimations.23 Again, our results of main interest 
are hardly affected by this different strategy of dealing with unobserved time‐invariant heterogeneity.
In column (5), we go one step further and employ source‐specific and host‐specific year fixed ef-
fects, which obliterates the concern that any omitted variables that vary over time in the source or in 
the host country could bias our results.24 Naturally, this model specification means that only the coef-
ficient of the interaction term is estimable, not the coefficients of the two constituent terms of FMD in 
source and host countries, as these are now collinear with the fixed effects. While the coefficient in 
this robustness test is slightly lower than the coefficient in the baseline model, even this specification 
suggests a statistically significant substitutive conditional effect.
4.4 | Traditional financial market development measures
Lastly, in results reported in Table 8, we employ two traditionally used measures of FMD, namely 
domestic credit allocated to the private sector by banks and other financial intermediaries normalised 
by GDP (private credit) and the stock market capitalisation‐to‐GDP ratio (stock_capital).25 Like in 
23 The data are taken from the standard gravity dataset provided by CEPII (http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/ en/bdd_model e/prese 
ntati on.asp?xml:id=8). For a detailed discussion of the data, see Head et al. (2010) and Head and Mayer (2014).
24 Note that we had to drop HC difference because otherwise the estimator did not converge.
25 Data are taken from Beck & Demirgüç‐Kunt (2009).
T A B L E  5  Robustness tests (developing host countries' sample)
 
Exclude tax haven 
countries
Exclude Argentina, 
Kazakhstan and Venezuela
Exclude top‐15 FMD 
source countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnGDPst−1 0.758 0.752 0.764 0.763 0.977 0.931
(0.501) (0.484) (0.491) (0.475) (0.676) (0.667)
lnGDPpcst−1 0.797* 0.755* 0.784* 0.744* 0.678 0.647
(0.434) (0.412) (0.422) (0.400) (0.414) (0.413)
lnGDPht−1 0.957*** 0.910*** 1.061*** 1.015*** 0.837*** 0.846***
(0.295) (0.290) (0.321) (0.317) (0.322) (0.322)
lnGDPpcht−1 0.0966 0.113 −0.0266 −0.0118 −0.330 −0.338
(0.275) (0.273) (0.293) (0.292) (0.258) (0.262)
FMDst−1 0.202*** 0.257*** 0.223*** 0.276*** 0.209*** 0.228***
(0.0498) (0.0515) (0.0499) (0.0511) (0.0729) (0.0761)
FMDht−1 0.187*** 0.239*** 0.178*** 0.221*** 0.307*** 0.317***
(0.0464) (0.0479) (0.0449) (0.0455) (0.0566) (0.0564)
FMDst−1 × FMDht−1   −0.169***   −0.174***   −0.0769
  (0.0433)   (0.0452)   (0.0525)
No. of observations 14,747 14,747 14,917 14,917 8,892 8,892
No. of country pairs 1,581 1,581 1,588 1,588 975 975
Notes: Dyad fixed effects and year fixed effects included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered on dyads. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
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Desbordes and Wei (2017), both variables are lagged by one year and enter in logged form. As we 
have argued above, we submit our comprehensive and novel measure of FMD as an improvement 
over these traditional measures, which only capture aspects of FMD, but it is worth testing whether 
our major finding of a substitutive conditioning effect in developing host countries holds with these 
previously employed measures as well.26 We find that independently of which of these two measures 
are chosen, FMD in origin countries never has a statistically significant effect. By contrast, FMD in 
the developing host country always has the expected positive and statistically significant effect. A one 
standard deviation increase in the two traditional host country FMD variables suggests a substantive 
effect of 26.0% and 26.7% for private credit and stock_capital, respectively, which is slightly higher 
than the 15.9% effect following a one standard deviation increase in our more comprehensive FMD 
variable. The coefficient of the interaction term between FMD in origin and source countries is nega-
tive for both measures but only statistically significant for Stockcapital. Plotting the marginal effects 
of FMD in host countries across the range of FMD in origin countries confirms the existence of a 
statistically significant substitutive conditional effect for stock_capital but not for private credit 
(graphs not shown).
26 Although our measure for financial market development covers a very broad range of financial market indicators and is thus 
more informative about the quantity and quality of FMD than single indicators, the correlation between FMD and these 
traditional measures is surprisingly strong: The correlation coefficient is 0.77 for private credit and 0.61 for stock_capital for 
FDI source countries and 0.66 for private credit and 0.60 for stock_capital for FDI host countries.
T A B L E  6  Robustness tests (developing host countries' sample)
 
Drop observations with negative FDI 
stock values
Drop observations with 
negative, zero or negligible FDI 
stock values
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnGDPst−1 0.810* 0.801* 0.649 0.661
(0.486) (0.471) (0.464) (0.458)
lnGDPpcst−1 0.780* 0.741* 0.912** 0.865**
(0.421) (0.401) (0.375) (0.364)
lnGDPht−1 1.060*** 1.018*** 0.996*** 0.954***
(0.321) (0.318) (0.335) (0.332)
lnGDPpcht−1 −0.0259 −0.0120 0.0598 0.0744
(0.293) (0.292) (0.315) (0.315)
FMDst−1 0.221*** 0.270*** 0.213*** 0.251***
(0.0490) (0.0500) (0.0483) (0.0488)
FMDht−1 0.173*** 0.223*** 0.166*** 0.197***
(0.0448) (0.0461) (0.0448) (0.0452)
FMDst−1 × FMDht−1   −0.162***   −0.148***
  (0.0436)   (0.0432)
No. of observations 15,061 15,061 10,710 10,710
No. of country pairs 1,629 1,629 1,426 1,426
Note: Dyad fixed effects and year fixed effects included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered on dyads. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
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T A B L E  7  Robustness tests (developing host countries' sample)
 
Extended model (dyad FE)
Extended model (host and 
source country FE)
Extended model (time‐
varying country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnGDPst−1 0.594 0.580 0.594 0.580  
(0.461) (0.456) (0.461) (0.456)  
lnGDPpcst−1 0.953** 0.913** 0.954** 0.913**  
(0.394) (0.380) (0.394) (0.380)  
lnGDPht−1 1.023*** 0.994*** 1.023*** 0.994***  
(0.334) (0.332) (0.334) (0.332)  
lnGDPpcht−1 −0.124 −0.108 −0.124 −0.108  
(0.303) (0.303) (0.303) (0.303)  
FMDst−1 0.206*** 0.248*** 0.206*** 0.248***  
(0.0496) (0.0503) (0.0496) (0.0503)  
FMDht−1 0.136*** 0.175*** 0.136*** 0.175***  
(0.0429) (0.0443) (0.0429) (0.0443)  
FMDst−1 × FMDht−1   −0.141***   −0.140*** −0.106***
  (0.0375)   (0.0375) (0.034)
lnImportssht−1 0.0859** 0.0874** 0.0859** 0.0875** 0.047*
(0.0426) (0.0433) (0.0426) (0.0432) (0.028)
RTAsht−1 0.121 0.122 0.121 0.122 0.002
(0.0832) (0.0806) (0.0832) (0.0805) (0.083)
BITsht−1 −0.0490 −0.0471 −0.0489 −0.0470 −0.102
(0.113) (0.0980) (0.113) (0.0980) (0.089)
DTTsht−1 0.134 0.132 0.134 0.132 0.180**
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.086)
HC differencesht−1 0.133 0.174 0.133 0.174  
(0.360) (0.355) (0.360) (0.355)  
PC differencesht−1 5.87e‐08* 4.69e‐08 5.87e‐08* 4.69e‐08 0.000**
(3.42e‐08) (3.50e‐08) (3.42e‐08) (3.50e‐08) (0.000)
ROLht−1 0.234** 0.245** 0.234** 0.245**  
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)  
Resourcesht−1 −0.00316 −0.00332 −0.00316 −0.00332  
(0.00318) (0.00315) (0.00318) (0.00315)  
lndistancesh     −1.278*** −1.288***  
    (0.104) (0.105)  
Comlangsh     0.673*** 0.704***  
    (0.170) (0.174)  
Colonysh     1.245*** 1.225***  
    (0.188) (0.190)  
(Continues)
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5 |  CONCLUSION
We have argued that FMD in both host and source countries matters for FDI and that one can substitute 
for the other. We estimated gravity‐type models to assess the effects of FMD in the host and source 
countries on bilateral FDI stocks simultaneously, allowing, in separate estimations, for the effect of 
FMD in one country of the country pair to be conditioned by FMD in the other country. In contrast to the 
existing literature, we use a much broader measure of FMD, based on a comprehensive set of financial 
market indicators. Our analysis covers a larger and more globally representative sample compared to 
existing studies, comprising 43 source countries and 137 host countries over the period 2001–12.
 
Extended model (dyad FE)
Extended model (host and 
source country FE)
Extended model (time‐
varying country FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Contiguitysh     0.613*** 0.649***  
    (0.205) (0.209)  
No. of observations 12,754 12,754 12,754 12,754 13,897
No. of country pairs 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,450 1,471
Notes: Dyad fixed effects and year fixed effects included in columns (1) and (2). Host and source country fixed effects and year fixed 
effects included in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors clustered on dyads. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is 
indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
T A B L E  7  (Continued)
T A B L E  8  Employing traditional FMD measures (developing host countries' sample)
 
Private credit Stock_capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnGDPst−1 −0.980 −0.944 −1.061 −0.810
(0.969) (0.987) (0.973) (0.964)
lnGDPpcst−1 2.954*** 2.883*** 2.923*** 2.722***
(0.974) (1.026) (0.946) (0.930)
lnGDPht−1 0.677** 0.674** 0.307 0.297
(0.329) (0.326) (0.248) (0.247)
lnGDPpcht−1 0.713** 0.709** 0.947*** 0.944***
(0.330) (0.326) (0.296) (0.293)
FMDst−1 −0.107 −0.129 0.0220 0.0169
(0.189) (0.190) (0.0672) (0.0654)
FMDht−1 0.292*** 0.306*** 0.219*** 0.242***
(0.0767) (0.0787) (0.0492) (0.0472)
FMDst−1 × FMDht−1   −0.0753   −0.0856**
  (0.155)   (0.0422)
No. of observations 11,132 11,132 9,732 9,732
No. of country pairs 1,496 1,496 1,225 1,225
Notes: Dyad fixed effects and year fixed effects included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered on dyads. Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
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One major finding is that bilateral FDI increases with better developed financial markets in both 
the host and the source country. This result is robust to various ways in which we indirectly account 
for potential reverse causality. More importantly, we also find evidence for a statistically significant 
conditional relationship but only if we restrict the analysis to developing host countries. Specifically, 
we find that FMD in the developing host country and FMD in the FDI source country function as 
substitutes for each other consistently across all estimation models.
This novel result has ambiguous implications for developing host countries, many of which have 
remained on the sidelines in the global competition for FDI. On the one hand, it suggests that poor 
FMD in developing host countries can be compensated for by highly developed financial markets in 
the FDI source countries. Clearly, given that financial markets are still very underdeveloped in devel-
oping countries, this is encouraging news. On the other hand, it also suggests that the payoff to better 
develop financial markets in developing host countries is not as large as policymakers might expect if 
the country's major FDI source countries themselves have highly developed financial markets. Future 
research should analyse whether similarly conditional effects prevail with regard to other FDI deter-
minants such as physical infrastructure in transportation and communication.
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APPENDIX 
T A B L E  A 1  Summary variables statistics
  N Mean SD Min Max
Total sample
FDI stocks 23,780 4,844 23,340 0 645,098
lnGDPs 23,780 27.18 1.26 24.28 30.26
lnGDPh 23,780 25.57 1.96 20.48 30.26
lnGDPpcs 23,780 9.89 1.00 6.85 11.14
lnGDPpch 23,780 8.76 1.53 4.91 11.14
FINs 23,780 1.05 0.83 −2.15 2.56
FINh 23,780 0.32 1.05 −2.20 2.56
Developing host countries' sample
FDI stocks 15,350 1,066 4,406 0 101,030
lnGDPi 15,350 27.27 1.28 24.28 30.26
lnGDPj 15,350 24.69 1.70 20.48 29.07
lnGDPpci 15,350 9.89 1.01 6.85 11.14
lnGDPpcj 15,350 7.90 1.18 4.91 11.02
FINi 15,350 1.08 0.79 −2.15 2.56
FINj 15,350 −0.14 0.89 −2.20 2.26
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T A B L E  A 2  List of FDI source countries
Argentina Denmark Italy New Zealand Switzerland
Australia Finland Japan Norway Thailand
Austria France Kazakhstan Poland Turkey
Belgium Germany Korea, Rep. Portugal United Arab 
Emirates
Brazil Greece Kuwait Russian Federation United Kingdom
Canada Hungary Libya Saudi Arabia United States
Chile India Malaysia South Africa Venezuela
China Ireland Mexico Spain  
Colombia Israel Netherlands Sweden  
T A B L E  A 3  List of FDI host countries
Afghanistan Cambodia Gabon Jordan Morocco
Russian 
Federation Togo
Albania Cameroon Georgia Kazakhstan Mozambique Rwanda Trinidad and 
Tobago
Algeria Canadaa Germanya Kenya Namibia Saudi Arabia Tunisia
Angola Chile Ghana Korea, Rep.a Nepal Senegal Turkey
Argentina China Greecea Kuwait Netherlandsa Serbia Uganda
Armenia Colombia Guatemala Kyrgyz Rep. New 
Zealanda
Sierra Ukraine
Australiaa Congo, 
Dem. Rep.
Guinea Lao Nicaragua Slovakiaa United Arab 
Emirates
Austriaa Congo, Rep. Guyana Latvia Niger Slovenia UKa
Azerbaijan Croatia Haiti Libya Nigeria South Africa USAa
Bangladesh Czech 
Republica
Honduras Lithuania Norwaya Spaina Uruguay
Belarus Denmarka Hungarya Macedonia Oman Sri Lanka Uzbekistan
Belgiuma Dominican 
Rep.
India Madagascar Pakistan Sudan Venezuela
Benin Ecuador Indonesia Malawi Papua New 
Guinea
Suriname Vietnam
Bolivia Egypt Iran Malaysia Paraguay Swaziland West Bank 
and Gaza
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
El Salvador Ivory 
Coast
Mali Peru Swedena Yemen, Rep.
Botswana Equatorial 
Guinea
Iraq Mauritania Philippines Switzerlanda Zambia
Brazil Estonia Irelanda Mexico Polanda Syria Zimbabwe
Bulgaria Ethiopia Israel Moldova Portugala Tajikistan  
Burkina Faso Finlanda Italya Mongolia Qatar Tanzania  
Cape Verde Francea Japana Montenegro Romania Thailand  
Note: aExcluded from developing host countries sample. 
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F I G U R E  A 1  Country ranking of FMD in 2012 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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F I G U R E  A 2  Mapping values of FMD. (a) 2001; (b) 2012 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
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(b) 2012
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F I G U R E  A 3  Density plot of financial market development in source countries [Colour figure can be viewed at 
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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